Political polarization in Bolivia morphed into action in June as trucks rammed and troops stormed the government palace in an eventually foiled military coup. Election-centered violence in the nation has taken a turn for the worse, disrupting civilian life and the transition of power. The chaos sparks questions about how President Luis Arce can safeguard national democracy.
Retracing the tire marks of military vehicles outside Bolivia’s Palacio Quemado, the latest attempt at junta control was described as an initiative to “preserve democracy,” with ex-Army General Juan Jose Zuniga in the driver’s seat. Under Arce, Zuniga served as military commander until the president removed him for his political motivations against Evo Morales, Arce’s predecessor. Interestingly, Zuniga’s actions come at a time when his anti-Morales interests intersect with Arce’s campaign.
The left-wing Movement for Socialism (MAS) party is experiencing a struggle for control following Evo Morales’ contending presidential bid against MAS-affiliated Arce 2025 in a “socialist split.” It comes as no surprise that Arce now faces allegations of a “self-coup” intended to weaken Morales’ presidential campaign and propel his own bid for office in the upcoming year.
Since Arce’s predecessor Morales took office in 2005, the left-wing socialist Party MAS has maintained power in the nation. Zuniga’s doctrine calls for a change; his alternative narrative often reiterates harmful right-wing propaganda about Morales’ indigenous identity. Arce’s actions are aligned with Zuniga’s anti-Morales principles but remain left-wing on paper. More recently, this strategy has involved blaming violent military sacks of bases in the region on Morales’ MAS faction. This polarization parallels the 2019-20 presidential election, which ended in election fraud allegations and Morales being exiled to Argentina.
Before the elections in August 2025, concerns held by citizens and candidates must be proactively addressed. A key method to uplift Bolivian democracy is through anticorruption measures within judicial election oversight bodies. Within the government, judicial bodies have historically been an extension of the executive branch, prioritizing politicians over constitutional policy. Legal systems have been weaponized against opposition leaders; for example, Arce’s administration has publicly pressured various investigative and judicial bodies within the government, leading to the arrest of Morales’ ex-chief of staff, Patricia Hermosa, and one of Morales’ babysitters, Edith Chavez Arauco. In Arce’s new regime, individuals like Chavez and Hermosa who aided Morales’ rise to power have been politically targeted and are currently stuck in pretrial detention. The nation’s leaders have a history of influencing arbitrary prosecutions, including Arce’s new wave of Morales charges that would potentially bar him from running in 2025.
An electoral subcommittee of Bolivia’s larger legal institution is led by an authority known as the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). During election years, citizens’ trust in democratic procedures lies in the hands of the TSE, a position with immense responsibility but little accountability. A United States institution declared the 2019 election “free and fair” in a statement following an investigation into the TSE. Still, domestic concerns contrast this report, with demonstrations and burnings near TSE buildings. Citizens criticized the TSE favoring Arce and Morales’ MAS party when the council elected to allow Morales to run for a fourth consecutive term in 2019. Their unheard concerns led to a military coup against Morales and the MAS government tightening its grip on elections, expelling any opposition, and barring democratic procedure. With two MAS candidates going head-to-head in next year’s election, citizens seem to be more receptive to Zuniga’s doctrine, seeking alternative governance. Ultimately, Bolivians are desperate for democracy.
Any operation to safeguard Bolivian democracy and bring peace to its borders must begin with the shadow “fourth branch” of the government, the TSE. One method of tackling this would be by replacing MAS-influenced TSE workers through a popular vote system or dissolving and reconstructing the oversight effort entirely; this could help the TSE check the executive branch’s power. The former seems more probable, democratizing the oversight body with citizens’ input. Having Bolivians vote on their oversight officials in a recurring election cycle would avoid the concentration of one-party power in an increasingly partisan state.
Additionally, members of the TSE and other politically weaponized judicial bodies must have an updated set of checks and balances. An example of this would be regulating what constitutes a political bribe, ensuring gifts from MAS-affiliated leaders carry little sway, and securing nonpartisanship. Solutions like the popular vote system are drawn from largely successful global counterparts within Mexico’s Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) or even South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Once confirmed to be apolitical, those working in the larger judicial branch must be able to operate apolitically without the threat of indictment by either MAS candidate in 2025. If Arce’s influence no longer extends into the judicial system, that judicial system will be more likely to drop trials for Morales and his sympathizers.
Restoring democracy in Bolivia also takes international action, specifically with investigations into electoral systems. Organizations like the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) and countries like Brazil can conduct election audits and push for domestic reform if needed. Furthermore, these organizations and countries can pressure Bolivia with sanctions–a threat that works because the citizens of Bolivia currently have a choice between three different candidates.
Most of all, Bolivia serves as a case study for democracy. With opposition and oversight, MAS-affiliated candidates will be more inclined to uplift the country. Electoral revival relies on infrastructural, interregional, and cross-party investments. It is abundantly clear that Bolivia must cast its vote for citizens before they can do the same.